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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CIRCUIT: THE FURTHER

SOMETHING SMELLS IN THE FIFTH
EROSION OF THE FOURTH AMEND-

MENT-United States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988).
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the drug problem continues to grow, police officers continue to
fight this losing battle.1 In order to stop the importation and distribution of drugs, police officers use a "drug courier profile" to detect and
apprehend individuals who traffick drugs through American airports.2
The "drug courier profile" is a compilation of characteristics that give
officers information to determine whether an airline traveler is trafficking drugs. 3 The presence of profile characteristics, combined with an
I. Since 1980, according to congressional sources, the influx of smuggled cocaine has risen
from approximately 25 tons a year to 125 tons a year. T. Morganthau & N. Finke Greensberg,

Crack and Crime,

NEWSWEEK,

June 16, 1986, at 19.

2. The decision in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), was the first time
that the drug courier profile was before the Supreme Court as an element of reasonable suspicion.
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Stewart, ignored consideration of the profile traits,
finding instead, that no seizure had taken place.
One month later, the drug courier profile was again before the Court in Reid v. Georgia, 448
U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam), but here the Court found the displayed profile traits insufficient for
reasonable suspicion. The Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that Reid's behavior was an insufficient basis for reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. The Court reasoned that a large number of
innocent travelers would be subject to random investigative stops if these traits were found sufficient to justify a stop. Something more was required; simply matching a person to a set of drug
courier profile traits did not justify a seizure. Finally, a more precise formulation for reasonable
suspicion using the characteristics in a drug courier profile was developed in United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
The Cortez Court established a totality of the circumstances approach for determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists. The approach entails a two step process. First, consideration
must be given to the objective observations gleaned from various law enforcement data seen in the
light of trained police experience. Falling under this part of the analysis would be the drug courier
profile. Second, consideration of the objective data in the first step must raise a suspicion of criminal activity "particularized" to the individual being stopped.
3. The drug courier profile is sometimes referred to as the "Markonni drug courier profile"
after DEA agent Paul J. Markonni, who is credited with creating the profile. See, e.g., United
States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Comment, Mendenhall and Reid:
The Drug Courier Profile and Investigative Stops, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 835, 837 n.15 (1981).
Profile characteristics are sometimes listed as primary and secondary characteristics. See,
e.g., United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (implying that characteristics listed as primary are more dispositive of drug activity than secondary characteristics), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). For a more detailed look at drug courier profile characteristics, see
Comment, The Drug Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable Intrusions or Suspicionless
Seizures?, 12 NOVA L.J. 273 (1987).
The drug courier profile has had an indirect impact even in Dayton, Ohio. See United States
v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 1981). Setzer was apprehended by DEA agent
Markonni at Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport. Setzer was on his way to Dayton, Ohio,
when agent Markonni noticed that he was extremely' nervous and that his initial return flight

Published by eCommons, 1988

762

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:3

officer's experience, gives an officer the reasonable suspicion necessary
to make an investigative stop permitted by Terry v. Ohio.4
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Lovell 5 gave the police carte blanche in airports. The Lovell court held
that police officers who do not have reasonable suspicion may constitutionally remove an airline traveler's luggage from the airline's possession, squeeze the luggage, and then smell the luggage. According to
the Lovell court, removing, squeezing, and smelling a passenger's luggage are not searches or seizures within the meaning of the fourth
7
amendment.
This casenote argues that a police officer's squeezing and smelling
of luggage, as in Lovell, constitute a search under the fourth amendment. This note, moreover, argues that the removal of luggage from an
airline's conveyor belt constitutes a seizure. In sum, this note argues
that the Lovell court provided yet another exception to the fourth
amendment, one that is at once inconsistent with the plain language of
the fourth amendment.

reservation was on an early weekday morning flight. Id. at 356.
4. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In a subsequent opinion, the Supreme Court applied
the Terry rationale to seizures of property:
[W]hen an officer's observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying
luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry and its progeny would permit the
officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983).
5. 849 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988). On July 8, 1988, seven other cases were handed down all
citing Lovell as controlling: United States v. Cagle, 849 F.2d 924, 926 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[ilt is
clear that the agents' removal of Cagle's bag from the conveyor belt, their comprcssion of the bag
to procure a scent, and their subsequent sniff of the bag did not constitute a seizure. It is equally
apparent . . . that the agents' prolonged detention of the suitcase . . . did so.") (citations omitted);
United States v. Garcia, 849 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1988) (border patrol agents' squeeze and sniff of
suitcase after removing it from an airport baggage area did not constitute a search or seizure as
established in Lovell); United States v. Gutierrez, 849 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1988) (border patrol
agent's rc.noval of suspect's bag from airport baggage area conveyor belt and squeeze of the bag
to procure a scent, constituted neither a search nor seizure as defined in Lovell); United States v.
Hahn, 849 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1988) (border patrol agent's removal of suitcase from airport baggage conveyor belt, squeeze of the bag to procure a scent, and subsequent sniff of the bag did not
constitute a search or seizure as established in Lovell); United States v. Karman, 849, F.2d 928
(5th Cir. 1988) (border patrol agents' compression and sniff of suitcases constitute neither a
search nor seizure within the meaning of Lovell); United States v. Roman, 849 F.2d 920 (5th Cir.
1988) (defendant Roman abandoned suitcases which he checked at airport, and thus, did not have
standing to challenge the search of the suitcases); United States v. Sawyer, 849 F.2d 938 (5th Cir.
1988) (border patrol agents' action removing suspect's baggage from airport baggage conveyor
belt and compressing the suitcase was not a search or seizure within the meaning of Lovell).
6.
7.

Lovell, 849 F.2d at 912-16.
Id.
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II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

On May 28, 1987, two United States Border Patrol Agents observed Benny Carl Lovell arrive at a Texas airport in a taxi cab.8 Both
agents watched Lovell remove one suitcase from the cab while the taxi
driver removed another.9 The suitcases were made of soft-sided nylon.' 0
The agents noticed that Lovell appeared to be very nervous." Lovell
checked his bags with the airport skycap and walked into the terminal. 12 One of the agents went to the baggage area and removed Lovell's
suitcases from the conveyor belt." The agents noticed that the suitcases were heavy and, when the agents touched the sides of the suitcases, they felt a solid mass."' The agents then compressed the sides of
the suitcases. 15 Upon compression, the agents "'got a real faint smell

8. Id. at 911.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The agents observed Lovell anxiously searching his pockets for money to pay the cab
driver and as he approached the skycap he glanced around nervously. Id. One of the agents who
was standing next to the skycap, watched as Lovell filled out the baggage claim checks. Id. The
agent noted that Lovell's writing was erratic and that Lovell kept glancing around nervously as he
wrote. Id. Another agent observed that Lovell "had a toothpick in his mouth and it was going 90
miles an hour." Id. Nervousness is one of the seven primary characteristics identified in Elmore v.
United States, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980).
Applying the two-step analysis for reasonable suspicion established in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), Lovell had but one characteristic under the drug courier profile-nervousness. Using step two of the Cortez test, one could hardly conclude that because
Lovell was nervous, he must be engaged in some type of criminal activity. Clearly, this one fact
could not have been used to satisfy a stop of Lovell. And it certainly could not justify a search of
his luggage.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988), has
effectively allowed law enforcement officials to sidestep the Constitution. It is clear from the above
analysis, and Fifth Circuit precedent, that the border agents in Lovell did not have reasonable
suspicion. The agents needed additional evidence that Lovell might be trafficking drugs in order to
stop him and conduct a limited investigative detention of him.
The observation of Lovell by the two agents involved identifying characteristics that are used
in a "drug courier profile." Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected that th' Infected Spy, as all Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye." 65 N.C.L. REV. 417 (1987).
As part of the DEA's airline surveillance program to intercept illegal drugs, the drug courier profile focuses on the conduct and appearance of air travelers. Based solely on the fact
certain airline passengers' behavior and appearance comport with the drug courier profile,
DEA agents have identified possible narcotics couriers and then stopped, questioned, and
arrested these individuals.
Id. at 418.
12. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 911.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. "Agent Williams described the mechanics of a baggage squeeze as follows: 'Well I
would squeeze enough in order to force enough air out to be able to smell it.' Agent Jordan
indicated that Williams 'put his nose up to the zipper part.'" Brief for Appellant at 3, United
States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1682) (citations omitted).
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of talcum powder and a real strong odor of marijuana.' "I' Before compressing the suitcases, the agents could not detect the smell of
7
marijuana.
After detecting the odor of marijuana, one of the agents attempted
to apprehend Lovell, but Lovell had already departed for Birmingham,
Alabama."8 The agents contacted the canine unit of the El Paso Police
Department, and arranged to have a narcotics-sniffing dog brought to
the airport.1 9 The agents put Lovell's suitcases in a lineup and the dog
alerted four times to Lovell's suitcases. 0 Thereafter, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was contacted and a search warrant was
obtained. 2 Pursuant to the warrant, the agents opened the suitcases
and found sixty-eight pounds of marijuana." The agents then called
the DEA in Birmingham, Alabama, and gave them a physical description of Lovell and his flight number. The Alabama DEA agents apprehended Lovell, and, after searching him, discovered baggage claim
tickets matching those on the suitcases in El Paso. "3
On June 16, 1987, Lovell was indicted by a federal grand jury on
one count charging that he unlawfully possessed marijuana with the
intent to distribute,"' in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 2" Lovell
moved to suppress all evidence.2 6 The district court denied Lovell's motion.2 7 Lovell then entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 28 Lovell appealed. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed three issues:
whether the agents' removal of Lovell's bags from the conveyor belt
constituted a seizure; whether the agents' compression of Lovell's bags
constituted either a search or seizure; and whether the agents' sniff of

16. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 911.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 911-12.
24. Id. at 912.
25. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988). Section 841(a)(1) provides that it is "unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally . . .to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Id.
26. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 912.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 911. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1I (a)(2) allows a defendant, with the
approval of government, to enter a conditional plea of guilty. FED. R. CRIM. P. II (a)(2). This, in
effect, reserves the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review the adverse determination of any
specified pretrial motion. On appeal, the issue in Lovell was the lower court's denial of Lovell's
motion to suppress. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 912.
29. Lovell. 849 F.2d at 912.
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Lovell's bags constituted a search."0 At the outset, the court of appeals
assumed, without deciding, that the agents did not have reasonable suspicion that Lovell's bags contained marijuana before they removed the
bags from the conveyor belt for a sniff test.3 1
The court of appeals first asked whether the agents' sniff of
Lovell's bags was a search.3 Relying upon its decision in United States
v. Goldstein,3 the court of appeals concluded that the agents' sniff of
Lovell's bags was not a search.3 4 Lovell tried to distinguish Goldstein
by arguing "that the agents' actions in the instant case were more intrusive than those in Goldstein because the agents squeezed his
bags."13 5 But the court of appeals rejected this reasoning36 and stated
that a similar argument had failed in United States v. Viera.3 7 Lovell,
moreover, argued that the agents' lifting and squeezing of his bags constituted a search.3 " Again, the court of appeals disagreed, concluding
that the handling of Lovell's bags was not a search.3 " Similarly, the
court of appeals found that the handling of Lovell's bags was not a
30. Id. Lovell did not appeal to the United States Supreme Court because
he had served his
sentence in full. Telephone interview with Elizabeth Rogers, Esq., First Assistant
Federal Public
Defender in El Paso, Texas (Nov. 3, 1988).
31. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 912 n.2.
32. Although the word "privacy" does not appear in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court
has recognized a constitutional right to privacy based upon the provisions of
the first, third, fourth,
fifth, and ninth amendments and their respective "penumbras." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-85 (1965). This right to privacy is a "fundamental personal
right." Id. at 494
(Goldberg, J., concurring); see, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886) (the fourth
amendment protects "the privacies of life"), overruled by Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294
(1967); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (the fourth amendment
protects "secrecy of
letters and .. .packages").
33.. 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962
(1981).
34. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 913. In Goldstein, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated "[it is
undisputed that, had one of the DEA agents through the use of his olfactory
sense detected the
odor of the controlled substances in the suitcases, a search would not have
occurred." Goldstein,
635 F.2d at 361.
35. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 913.
36. Id.
37. 644 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. Unit B May), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981).
In Viera, the
defendants were traveling by bus from Los Angeles to Miami. Id. at 510.
Upon changing from
one bus to another in Jacksonville, the bus driver transferred six suitcases
belonging to the defendants from one bus to another. Id. While the bus driver was loading the last
of the six bags, it came
open somewhat, and he observed several bags of pills and white powder
in the suitcase. Id. The
bus driver telephoned the DEA in Miami, and upon their arrival, the Miami
DEA agents escorted
the defendants into the bus terminal where they were arrested. Id. The defendants
argued that the
government "prepped" the bags before they were subjected to a canine sniff,
a process not authorized by the court's earlier decision in Goldstein. Id. at 510. The Viera court
agreed that Goldstein
did not deal with prepping specifically, but it reasoned that "a light press
of the hands along the
outside of a suitcase [was] not sufficiently intrusive to require a different
result." Id.
38. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 912-15.
39. Id. at 915-16.
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seizure.4 As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's
dismissal of Lovell's suppression motion."'
III.

BACKGROUND

Throughout the years, the Supreme Court has changed the way it
applies the fourth amendment.4 2 Early decisions interpreting the fourth
amendment held that individuals received no fourth amendment protection unless they had propriety or possessory interests in the property
44
searched. 3 For example, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that eavesdropping on telephone conversations by "tapping"

the wires was not a search because "wires are not part of [one's] house

or office any more than are the highways along which they are
stretched. ' 45 The Court applied a trespass doctrine and reasoned that a
4
search required an actual physical invasion into a protected area.
Years later, the Court disposed of the trespass doctrine in Katz v.
United States." In Katz, the Court held that it was a search to attach
an electronic eavesdropping device to the outside of a telephone booth
48
in order to hear and record conversations inside the booth. The Katz
standard, set out in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, focused on the
49
issue of privacy as opposed to an individual's property interest. Justice
Harlan stated that the Constitution will protect individuals who "have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and ... that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
40. The Lovell court distinguished the fourth amendment violation in United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). The Lovell court reasoned that Lovell had surrendered his bag to a
third-party common carrier with the expectation that the carrier would transport the luggage to
his destination. Id. at 916., The Lovell court noted that there "[was] no suggestion that if the
agents had not smelled marijuana, Lovell's travel would have been interfered with or his expectations with respect to his luggage frustrated." Id. (emphasis added). According to the court, "Itihe
momentary delay occasioned by the bags' removal from the conveyer belt was insufficient to constitute a meaningful interference with Lovell's possessory interest in his bags." Id.
41. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 916.
42. The Supreme Court did not interpret the fourth amendment until 1886. See Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), overruled by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The
case involved forfeiture proceedings under a revenue act which provided that a refusal to produce
requested documents would be considered a confession to the government's allegations. Id. at 620.
Although there was no actual search and seizure, "[the act] accomplishes the substantial object of
[search and seizure] acts in forcing from a party evidence against himself." Id. at 622. The importance of Boyd lies in the sweeping view of the protection against unreasonable intrusions adopted
by the Court.
43. See. e.g., Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
44. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
45. Id. at 465.
46. Id. at 463-69.
47. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
48. Id. at 353.
49. Id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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'reasonable.' "50
To determine whether society will recognize a privacy interest, one
must balance the governmental interests against the individual's expectation of privacy.5 1 This balancing test is used not only to determine
privacy interests, but also to affect the probable cause standard when
the government's intrusion on privacy rises to the level of a search.5"
The Court addressed this issue in Terry v. Ohio.53 In examining the
constitutional limits of "stop and frisk" encounters, the Court excepted
conduct of this kind from the traditional requirement of probable
cause. 54 The Court reasoned:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.55
The Court extended the scope of Terry to seizures of personal
property in United States v. Place.56 In Place, the'Court considered the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unlawful searches in connection with a dog's sniff of a traveler's luggage at a public airport.57 The
Court held that a dog's sniff was not a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. 58 Recognizing that people have a privacy interest in their luggage, the Court emphasized the non-intrusive nature of a
dog's sniff.59 The Court reasoned that a dog's sniff is much less intrusive than a typical search because the officers do not have to rummage
through personal effects. 6" Additionally, the Court emphasized the limited disclosure of information 'obtained via a dog sniff.61 This limited
disclosure ensures that the owner of the luggage is not embarrassed or

50.
5I.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 361.
Id.
Id.
392 U.S. I (1968).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 30.
462 U.S. 696 (1983).
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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inconvenienced. 2
The first time the Court had addressed the reasonableness of a
warrantless search based upon an odor was in Taylor v. United
States.6" In Taylor, a group of liquor prohibition agents investigated a
certain location following complaints indicating the presence of illegal
liquor. 6" Upon arriving at the location, the agents detected the smell of5
whiskey emanating from a garage adjacent to Taylor's residence.
Peering through a small opening in the garage, the agents observed a
number of cardboard cases that they suspected contained jars of whiskey.6" After removing a lock and entering the garage, the agents con67
ducted a search, uncovering a large cache of liquor. Taylor arrived at
68 The Taylor Court did not dispute the
the garage and was arrested.
69
value of odor, but found that the search could not be justified. The
search was unreasonable because the agents had not obtained, or even
a search warrant despite their "abundant opportuattempted to obtain,
7
1
so.
nity" to do
The Court next dealt with odor and warrantless searches in Johnson v. United States.71 There an experienced police lieutenant of the
Seattle narcotics department received information that unknown persons were smoking opium in a hotel. 72 An attempt to get further information at the hotel revealed a strong odor of burning opium in the
hallway. 7" The lieutenant left and returned with several federal nar76
cotic agents.7 4 The odor was traced to a room in the hotel. The of76
ficers knocked and a voice from within asked who was there. "Lieutenant Beland," an officer replied. 77 Johnson opened the door and
admitted the officers. Johnson was arrested. 78 After arresting Johnson,

62.
63.
64.
victed of
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
tive odor
owner of
70.

Id.
286 U.S. 1 (1932).
Id. at 5. Taylor, the resident of the premises, was known to have been previously conviolating prohibition laws.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6. The Taylor Court stated that the "[p]rohibition officers may rely on a distincas a physical fact indicative of possible crime; but its presence alone does not strip the
a building of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search." Id.
Id.

71.

333 U.S. 10 (1948).

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the officers searched the room.7 9 The search yielded opium and a warm
smoking apparatus."0 The Supreme Court found the arrest unlawful.1
The entry to Johnson's room was granted by her involuntary submission to authority.8 2 In passing, the Court noted "that odors alone do not
authorize a search without warrant.983

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

There Was a Search of Lovell's Luggage

Unlike a person, luggage possesses no fourth amendment rights.8 4
Accordingly, to determine whether the agents' actions in United States
v. Lovel18 5 constituted a search, one must determine whether the
agents' actions violated Lovell's reasonable expectations of privacy in
his luggage.8 The Lovell court was quick to conclude that the agents
had not violated Lovell's privacy interest in his luggage. 7 This conclu-

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 17.
82. Id. at 16.
83. Id. at 13. The facts in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), are different
from
those in Lovell. In Johnson, the officers walked down the hallway and could smell a strong
odor of
opium, which eventually led them to the defendant's room. The officers in Lovell did
not walk by
the conveyor belt and smell marijuana emanating from Lovell's luggage. Indeed, the
officers noticed that Lovell was acting unusually nervous for an air traveler and they decided
themselves to
remove his luggage from the conveyor belt after Lovell had checked them with
the Southwest
Airline's clerk. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 911. After removing his luggage, the agents compressed
and
squeezed his luggage and as air was forced from within the locked suitcases in to the
"public air,"
the agents detected, through their olfactory senses, "a real faint smell of talcum powder
and a real
strong odor of marijuana." Id.
The actions of the agents were much more intrusive than what the Fifth Circuit would
choose
to believe. The agents had to touch and compress Lovell's luggage before they could
smell any
odor of marijuana. Therefore, this case is significantly different from Johnson, where
experienced
narcotics agents, acting on an informant's tip, smelled the odor of burning opium (in
"public air")
and could actually follow the scent right to Johnson's hotel room. Johnson, 333 U.S.
at 12. The
narcotics agents did nothing to enhance their senses. They did not walk down the hall,
open up the
door to Johnson's room and then determine that there was opium in the room. In
effect, this is
what the border agents did to Lovell when they squeezed and sniffed his luggage.
84. See supra text accompanying note 34. The Supreme Court has stated:
[Tlhe Fourth Amendment protects people not places. What a person knowingly exposes
to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may
be constitutionally protected.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted).
Despite the clear language, courts regularly find that the expectation of privacy of a
person in
his luggage is lessened because he has brought the luggage into a public airport.
85. 849 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988).
86. Id. at 912.
87. To determine whether Lovell had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his luggage,
the
court applied the test set out in Katz. The expectation of privacy must be an "actual"
one, one
that is subjectively held by the person affected by the search. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J.,
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sion, however, is unconvincing. An airline traveler should not lose his
fourth amendment protection in his luggage simply because luggage is
highly mobile or is found in a public place. In an airport setting, privacy interests in luggage are high. A traveler often has his most valuable and private possessions in his luggage and wants to shield these
items from the prying eyes of strangers-especially the government."'
To the traveler, luggage containing personal belongings represents one
of the few hallmarks of privacy.
The actions by the agents clearly violated Lovell's reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his luggage. The Lovell court
recognized the idea that "when airport security concerns are not implicated, 'every passenger who has luggage checked with an airline enjoys
a reasonable expectation of privacy that the contents of that luggage
will not be exposed in the absence of consent or a legally obtained warrant.' "89 Yet the Lovell court failed to adhere to this important
principle.
In Lovell, there was no evidence that the presence of Lovell's luggage on the conveyor belt implicated any airport concerns. Therefore,
Lovell had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his
luggage. There were other constitutional procedures that could have
been used without violating Lovell's reasonable expectation of privacy.
Since the agents were suspicious that Lovell was trafficking drugs, they
should have asked to talk with him before he boarded the airplane.
This, however, was not done.
Absent any legitimate airport concerns, the agents' actions could
only be justified if Lovell had consented to the search of his luggage or
the agents had obtained a search warrant. Lovell had not consented to
the search by the agents. In fact, there was no consent from the baileeairline, which had legal possession of Lovell's luggage. Further, there
was no valid search warrant obtained before the search by the agents.
The agents obtained a search warrant only after squeezing, touching,
90
and smelling Lovell's luggage. Such action by government officials is

concurring). This expectation must "be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Id.
88. For an earlier case stating this same proposition as it applies to a footlocker, see United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977). The Supreme Court stated:
By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an
expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination. No less than one
who locks the doors of his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . ..
Id. at 11.
89. Lovell, 849 F.2d at 913 (quoting United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th
Cir. Unit B Jan.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981)).
90. Lovell. 849 F.2d at 911.
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at odds with the constitutional protections provided in the fourth
amendment. Therefore, absent Lovell's consent or a valid search warrant, the agents' actions clearly violated Lovell's reasonable expectation
of privacy. This violation of Lovell's privacy interest leads to only one
possible conclusion-the touching, squeezing, and smelling of Lovell's
luggage was an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment.
The Lovell court, relying on United States v. Goldstein," concluded that the actions by the agents did not constitute a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. Specifically, the court concluded that "[tihe agents' sniff of Lovell's bags was not a search."9 In
Goldstein, the Fifth Circuit concluded that "[t]he agents' use of a canine's more enhanced ... olfactory sense cannot convert a sniff of the
exterior of those suitcases into a search.""3 Applying Goldstein, the
Lovell court concluded that a human sniff was not a search of Lovell's
luggage."4 This non-intrusive dog sniff, however, was not at all present
in Lovell. A dog does nothing to enhance his sense of smell: the dog
either smells the presence of contraband or it does not. The dog in
Goldstein detected an aroma of narcotics by smelling the luggage and
the air surrounding it. 95 In order to detect an odor of marijuana, the
agents in Lovell had to do something more than what the dog in Goldstein did. They had to search the luggage. The agents had to remove
the luggage from the conveyor belt and then squeeze and touch the
luggage before they could detect an odor of marijuana. 6 The combination- of these acts-removing, touching, squeezing, and then smelling-is very different from walking by Lovell's luggage and detecting
an odor of marijuana. Only if the agents had walked past Lovell's luggage as it sat on the conveyor belt and detected an odor of marijuana
emanating from his luggage, would they have acted similarly to the dog
in Goldstein. In that situation, they would have detected an odor of
marijuana that was present in the airspace surrounding Lovell's luggage, where Lovell has no reasonable expectation of privacy. In short,
the human sniff in Lovell is not analogous to the canine sniff in
Goldstein.
The actions of the agents in Lovell are analogous to the actions of
the police officer in Hicks v. Arizona.9" In Hicks, police officers entered
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan.), cert denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981).
Lovell, 849 F.2d at 913.
Goldstein, 635 F.2d at 361.
Lovell, 849 F.2d at 913.
Goldstein, 635 F.2d at 359.
Lovell, 849 F.2d at 911.
480 U.S. 321 (1987).
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98
an apartment building after hearing the sound of gunfire. Once inside
the apartment, the officers began looking for weapons, the shooter, and
99
possible victims of the shooting. The search of the apartment was
0 0 During
constitutional under the doctrine of exigent circumstances.
the search of Hicks' apartment, however, one of the officers noticed an
expensive stereo component "which seemed out of place in the squalid
10 1 The officer moved
and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment."
the stereo component in order to get its serial number, as he suspected
that it had been stolen.1 0 2 Holding that the moving of the stereo component, even a few inches, was a violation of Hicks' fourth amendment
rights, Justice Scalia wrote: "[T]aking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of
unjustified by the exigent circumstance that valirespondent's privacy
10 3
entry.
the
dated
In Hicks, the actions of the police officer went beyond the permiscomponent.10 4
sible scope of the lawful entry when he moved the stereo
If the officer had "[m]erely inspect[ed] those parts of the turntable

that came into view during the . . . search [his actions] would have

105
produced no additional invasion of [Hicks'] privacy interest."
The principles established in Hicks are applicable to the agents'
106 had the agents
actions in Lovell. Under the doctrine of "plain odor,"
walked past Lovell's luggage and detected an odor of marijuana, their
actions would have produced no invasion of Lovell's privacy interest,
since Lovell has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the air surrounding his luggage. However, like the police officer in Hicks, the actions of the agents exposed their sense of smell to the hidden items
contained inside Lovell's luggage. The agents removed Lovell's luggage
from the conveyor belt and began to touch, squeeze, and smell his luggage. These actions exceeded the permissible bounds of "plain odor,"
just as the officers' turning of the stereo equipment in Hicks exceeded
the permissible bounds of the "plain view" exception to the fourth
amendment. Indeed, the agents in Lovell unreasonably searched

98. Id. at 323.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 324.
101. Id. at 323.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 325.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See United States v. Salis, 536 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[G]enerally evidence
acquired by unaided human senses from without a protected area is not considered an illegal
invasion of privacy .... ").
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Lovell's luggage.
B.

There Was a Seizure of Lovell's Luggage

Relying on United States v. Place,10 7 the Lovell court concluded
that the actions by the border agents did not constitute a seizure within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. 0 8 In Place, Justice O'Connor
stressed that the seizure of luggage from a suspect's immediate possession can invade personal liberty interests as well as possessory interests. 10 9 Justice O'Connor stated:
The person whose luggage is detained is technically still free to continue
his travels or carry out other personal activities pending release of the
luggage. .

.

. Nevertheless, such a seizure can effectively restrain the

person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel plans
in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for its return." '

Unlike the defendant in Place, Lovell's luggage was removed from
a conveyor belt and not from his person. The luggage was in the possession of a bailee, Southwest Airlines. Lovell, by the terms of the airline
agreement, allowed the airline to take possession, and not ownership, of
his luggage and promptly return it to him when he arrived in Birmingham, Alabama. Lovell, as a bailor, agreed only to give possession of his
luggage to the airline and no one else. At no time did Lovell expressly
or impliedly agree to allow a third party, the border agents, to interfere
with the airline's possession of his luggage. It was the physical removal
of the bags from the airline's conveyor belt that violated the possessory
interest of Lovell in his luggage. Lovell's flight plans were not interrupted. But that is not significant. It is the possibility of interruption
that constitutes a seizure. Had the investigation of Lovell's luggage by
the border agents proved futile, they may have been unable to return
the luggage to the airport personnel. The Lovell decision effectively allows government officials to interfere with a bailment situation to which
the government is not a party.
V.

CONCLUSION

In United States vi.
Lovell,"' the agents violated Lovell's reasonable expectations of privacy when they removed and squeezed Lovell's
baggage. Although Lovell did not have an expectation of privacy in the
air surrounding the luggage, he did have a privacy interest in the con107.
108.
109.
110.
IMl.

462 U.S. 696 (1983).
Lovell, 849 F.2d at 916.
Place, 462 U.S. at 708.
Id.
849 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988).
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tents of the luggage.' 1 2 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lovell
has frustrated the constitutional safeguards recently provided by the
13
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Place. The Lovell
4 Other legal alternadecision allows the police too much discretion."
tives were available to the border patrol agents in Lovell. They had the5
use of narcotics-sniffing dogs and the opportunity to question Lovell."
By using these constitutional alternatives, they could have performed
their jobs effectively and protected Lovell's fourth amendment rights.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has created another exception to the fourth amendment.
Todd Martin Gascon

112.
113.
114.
receipt or
Appellant
argument
115.

Id. at 914.
462 U.S. 696 (1983).
Lovell was neither informed that his luggage had been seized, nor was he given a
a phone number that he might use if the seizure proved to be unwarranted. Brief for
at 11, United States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1682). This same
was made in United States v. Cagle, 849 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1988).
Lovell. 849 F.2d at 911.
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